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The study of legal history took an imperial turn some twenty 
years ago. In a book review published in 2007, John Fabian Witt, a 
leading historian of military law, remarked that “[o]ld-fashioned 
empire” was “suddenly everywhere.”1 Empire had been the subject of a 
series of lengthy institutional studies, written around mid-century, that 
described the formal legal structures of transnational enterprise and 
government during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.2 The new 
studies that had caught Witt’s eye were nominally concerned with the 
same subject. But there are also significant differences. The new studies 
tended to rely on different sources: rather than acts of Parliament, 
opinions of the courts at Westminster, and the charters, commissions, 
 
 * Professor, University at Buffalo School of Law, State University of New York. This essay 
is a response to Christian R. Burset, Advisory Opinions and the Problem of Legal Authority, 74 
VAND. L. REV. 621 (2021). I want to thank Professor Burset and editor Shivam Bhakta for the 
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 1. John Fabian Witt, Anglo-American Empire and the Crisis of the Legal Frame (Will the 
Real British Empire Please Stand Up), 120 HARV. L. REV. 754, 754 (2007) (book review). 
 2. For example, see JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE 
AMERICAN PLANTATIONS (1950); JULIUS GOEBEL, JR. & THOMAS RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW 
ENFORCEMENT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1664–1776) (1944); 
LEONARD WOODS LABAREE, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA: A STUDY OF THE BRITISH COLONIAL 
SYSTEM BEFORE 1783 (1930). Here you might also fit the old casebooks in “Development of Legal 
Institutions,” including JOSEPH H. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS (1965); John Philip Dawson, The Development of Law and Legal Institutions (1968) 
(unpublished manuscript). Professor Dawson’s unpublished manuscript became the basis for the 
contemporary casebook by John Langbein, Renee Lerner, and Bruce Smith. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, 
RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS xxvi (2009). 
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and orders of the Privy Council, the new studies focused on writings 
produced by the individuals navigating frontier encounters, like orders, 
letters, journals, and newspaper items. The analytic framework was 
different: the old construct of a “first British empire” gave way to 
multiple imperial projects, intersecting with diverse populations of 
settlers and enslaved or indigenous peoples, each with their own 
purposes. The voice and narration were different: in contrast to the 
disembodied character of the old-fashioned studies, the new accounts 
were granular, dynamic, and more revealing of human experience and 
activity in administration. Looking back now, twenty years out, it 
seems right to conclude that this change in approach was fruitful, 
producing a deeper understanding of colonialism, the imperial crisis 
and American Revolution, and the projects of constitution-making and 
western expansion that followed.3 
But though legal history took an imperial turn, many other 
areas of legal scholarship did not. For some subjects this seems 
appropriate; for others it is surprising. For instance, although the 
literature of constitutional law has long been historical,4 much of it 
remains domestic on principle and stubbornly institutional. A glance at 
the leading law reviews suggests that most legal scholarship is 
doctrinal—a form of history—but without much attention to the 
significance of these boundaries to the study. 
The effect has been to open a gap between historical scholarship 
and cognate studies in the law. For example, the nature of the federal 
judicial function is a topic with significant historical content, touching 
on some of the same subject matter as our new imperial legal histories; 
yet the perspective remains essentially national, framing the federal 
courts as a response to concerns with national revenue, debt, and 
matters of foreign policy like the enforcement of treaties, jurisdiction 
over aliens, and captures at sea. As Professor Burset explains, some 
aspects of the topic, like the ban on advisory opinions, are understood 
in exclusively domestic terms (with a compulsory nod to relevant 
 
 3. Major contributions to this line include LAUREN BENTON, LAW AND COLONIAL CULTURES: 
LEGAL REGIMES IN WORLD HISTORY, 1400–1900 (2002); DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING 
EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 
1664–1830 (2005); MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL 
CULTURE AND THE EMPIRE (2004); ELIGA H. GOULD, AMONG THE POWERS OF THE EARTH: THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE MAKING OF A NEW WORLD EMPIRE (2012); LISA FORD, SETTLER 
SOVEREIGNTY: JURISDICTION AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLE IN AMERICA AND AUSTRALIA, 1788–1836 
(2010); JACK P. GREENE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2011); 
Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502 (2006). 
 4. G. Edward White, The Arrival of History in Constitutional Scholarship, 88 VA. L. REV. 
485, 487 (2002). 
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English precedents).5 This may be because the leading casebook in the 
field, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts & The Federal System, 
first published in 1953, was framed in response to a concern with the 
effect of modern federal jurisdiction on domestic divisions of power, 
principally between federal and state courts, and between Congress and 
the federal judiciary—a framing that subsequent editions of the book 
have largely retained.6 While there have been many contributions to 
the scholarly study of federal judicial power since Hart and Wechsler 
was first published, the giants of the field still hold a kind of magnetic 
power over its line of development. 
To pull the study of advisory opinions off this course would 
require a contribution of considerable mass. Although it is now rare, a 
new source might do the trick, and this is what Professor Burset 
promises us here. He has made a study of the archival and published 
papers of judges in late-eighteenth century British-governed Bengal.7 
What relevance could they have to the power of federal judges? As 
Professor Burset interprets them, those papers reveal British Bengali 
judges wrestling with the same concerns that led to the abandonment 
of advisory opinions in England and America. If judges in all three 
common-law jurisdictions decided to abandon advisory opinions around 
the same time, then their abandonment was “a global phenomenon that 
requires a transnational explanation.”8 Perhaps most strikingly, the 
transnational explanation that Professor Burset offers is an intellectual 
one. The reason that judges across the common-law world abandoned 
advisory opinions was because of a breakdown in the “jurisprudential 
orthodoxy” that had treated judicial opinions as declarations of existing 
law.9 This breakdown led to an examination of what made statements 
of the law authoritative. Whether judicial advice should enjoy the same 
authority and status as opinions in litigated cases was unclear and 
disputed. In this intellectual context, Professor Burset argues, judges 
were unwilling to give advisory opinions for fear of how they might 
be used. 
The article is significant for the archival work alone. It is useful, 
as well, for the impressive synthesis of the existing secondary 
literature, collected in the footnotes, which makes a convenient reading 
 
 5. See Burset, supra note *, at 623.  
 6. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 
953, 957, 962 (1994); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and 
the Federal System, 87 HARV. L. REV. 889, 889 (1974) (book review).  
 7. See Burset, supra note *, at 643–50. 
 8. Id., at 623.  
 9. Id., at 623, 659–60.  
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list for us mere mortals. The argument of the article is ambitious. As 
the Table of Contents suggests, its structure is complex: the author asks 
us to visit three different jurisdictions (two British and one American, 
each thousands of miles apart), in three different decades, in three 
different political and social contexts, with three different institutional 
frameworks. The author moves the reader discontinuously through 
time, interpreting each context both for its meaning to the historical 
actors embedded within it, and for its significance to contemporary 
constitutional law.  
I want to use this Response to explore some of the complexities 
of this argument. I’d like to ask: What does it mean to give a 
“transnational” explanation? Is one actually necessary here, as the 
author avers? What place does the “local” have in such an explanation? 
Does a transnational explanation of the formal abandonment of 
advisory opinions actually rule out local factors and contributing 
causes—or does it, in fact, require them? What does it mean to give a 
transnational intellectual explanation—to explain the decline of 
advisory opinions by reference to an anxiety about their authoritative 
status? Intellectual causation is somewhat uncommon in contemporary 
legal history, which prefers to emphasize the “contingency” of legal 
ideas and institutions by attributing their adoption to material self-
interest or to the complex calculations that track the distribution of 
power in modern political societies. And what is the connection, exactly, 
between Justice Elijah Impey of the Supreme Court of Judicature in 
Bengal and Justice John Jay of the United States Supreme Court? Does 
their saying the same words, or expressing the same anxieties, mean 
they were moved by the same “idea,” even if the men never actually 
communicated?10 What about the fact that they acted in different 
political, social, cultural, and institutional contexts? 
These are not just questions for Professor Burset. They are 
questions for fellow-travelers on our twenty-year imperial journey. The 
new studies of empire often focus on individuals at the periphery. Are 
these studies of empire, or of those individuals? If we think of the 
empire as a formal structure of institutions and laws, precisely what 
does a study of its settlers and magistrates tell us about that structure? 
Do the formal structures of institutions and laws contribute anything 
to how those individuals experience the world around them and act on 
 
 10. See Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, in MEANING 
& CONTEXT: QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS 29, 54–56 (James Tully ed., 1988). 
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it? Does form contribute to experience? (This is a perspective I have tried 
to explore in my own work on colonial Virginia.11) 
In what follows, I won’t try to answer these abstract questions 
themselves. Rather, I will sketch some of what I take to be the relevant 
history for understanding the abandonment of advisory opinions, but 
which is not part of Professor Burset’s account. By adducing this 
material, my aim is to raise the larger questions by implication, and to 
get a sense, thereby, of the boundaries of Professor Burset’s argument, 
and of the terms on which we might refine and incorporate it into our 
understanding of the nature of the federal judicial power. 
I. ANXIETY ABOUT THE NATURE OF LEGAL AUTHORITY 
It is now commonplace to observe that in the eighteenth century, 
judges were thought to have a purely declaratory function. They 
declared what the law was (jus dicere), rather than giving it (jus dare), 
or making it, as we say today when we speak of “judge-made law.” 
Blackstone included this declaratory theory in his Commentaries, 
observing that the judge “is only to declare and pronounce, not to make 
or new-model, the law.”12 Why it should have been thought important 
to insist on this point is generally less discussed. This was not a theory 
of absolute stasis in the law, though it is sometimes described that way. 
Blackstone did not insist on the fiction that the common law had 
remained unchanged “since time immemorial,” as had Edward Coke in 
the seventeenth century; indeed, Blackstone argued, adaptation 
constituted the chief advantage of the common law over statutory law.13 
Many commentators regarded the mass of statutory law then being 
enacted by Parliament as confused, contradictory, oppressive, and 
inconsistent with English liberty. In contrast, the common law was the 
repository of English liberty, even though it had changed over time to 
meet new social problems. The point of the declaratory theory was to 
clarify the role of judges in the maintenance of English liberty. Judges 
 
 11. Matthew Steilen, The Legislature at War: Bandits, Runaways and the Emergence of a 
Virginia Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 37 LAW & HIST. REV. 493 (2019). 
 12. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: BOOK III: OF PRIVATE 
WRONGS 216 (Thomas P. Gallanis & Wilfrid Prest eds., 2016) (1768) (emphasis omitted). 
 13. DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 72–73 (1989). Probably the best known expression of this view in 
the Commentaries is Blackstone’s image of the common law as a “Gothic castle, erected in the days 
of chivalry, but fitted up for a modern inhabitant.” BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at 178. For Coke’s 
view that the common law had remained unchanged since time immemorial, see J.G.A. POCOCK, 
THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN 
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: A REISSUE WITH A RETROSPECT 35–41 (1987); Gerald J. Postema, 
Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part I), 2 OXFORD U. COMMONWWEALTH L.J. 155, 169–70 
(2002). 
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were to declare existing legal principles and then apply them 
reasonably to the situation at hand. They could do this because the 
principles were relatively determinate at any one point of time. Rarely 
did judges alter the principles themselves. Rather, they were changed 
insensibly, over time, simply by application. This made legal change 
reasonably predictable; as defenders often put it, the common law was 
“certain,” rather than arbitrary, and because it was certain, it preserved 
liberty.14 The connection between the common law and English liberty 
was often repeated and became a motif in the eighteenth-century 
political rhetoric of conservative Whigs and Tories. 
This perspective placed a tremendous amount of pressure on 
describing judicial decisionmaking in an accurate way. Did English 
judges actually preserve the certainty of the law by using reason to 
adapt it to emerging social problems? Professor Burset tells us that 
something of a crisis affected the common law in the mid-eighteenth 
century, and suggests several possible causes.15 I suspect the precise 
source of the crisis is important to his account. If the declaratory theory 
crumbled under its own intellectual weight, because its account of the 
law began to appear doubtful, then we make way for an intellectual 
explanation of the judicial abandonment of advisory opinions of the 
transnational form he wants to offer. On the other hand, perhaps the 
ultimate cause wasn’t intellectual, but grew out of the social conditions 
in which judges were educated and worked. In that case, we might 
expect a local explanation to be necessary—assuming English, 
American, and Bengali judges did not share these conditions. Or, as I 
think most likely, we may need to invoke both transnational and local 
explanations to account for the decline of advisory opinions. 
The declaratory theory of judging is usually introduced as a foil, 
and this is largely because modern readers have trouble understanding 
how one could ever find such a view persuasive as an actual account of 
the judicial office. The polarization, violence, and decline of civil society 
that America and Europe are presently experiencing make this 
difficulty more acute. We are evidently missing something that common 
lawyers of the past had, which made the declaratory theory feasible as 
a theoretical solution to their concerns. The “certainty” of the common 
law required the existence of a set of attitudes and values shared among 
the members of the bench and bar whose activities maintained the law. 
Those shared attitudes and values were born, at least in part, out of a 
 
 14. Emily Kadens, Justice Blackstone’s Common Law Orthodoxy, 103 NW. U.L. REV. 1553, 
1558 (2009). 
 15. Burset, supra note *, at 660–61. 
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process of acculturation and socialization that had long been part of 
English legal education at the Inns of Court. Common lawyers referred 
to the professional opinion produced by this process as “common 
erudition” or “common learning.”16 Their shared outlook was born, as 
well, out of a common economic and social status as gentlemen. These 
social forces generated a frame of mind that made “certainty” possible 
within the institutions where the common law was declared. As the 
English legal historian and theorist Brian Simpson put it, reflecting on 
the history of the common law, it is within “a tightly cohesive group,” 
possessing “a wide measure of consensus upon basic ideas and values,” 
that it becomes possible for “[a]rgument and discussion” to “commonly 
produce agreement in the end.”17 Without them, “[t]here is no a priori 
reason for supposing . . . there is a rational way of resolving disputes.”18 
By the time we reach the period under study in Professor 
Burset’s article, these constitutive social forces had weakened severely, 
and in some cases even lapsed. The Inns of Court began to decline in 
the late seventeenth century and essentially served no educational 
function at all by the middle of the eighteenth century. Efforts to create 
an institutional substitute at the English universities, such as the 
famous Vinerian chair at Oxford, which Blackstone occupied, were 
ultimately unsuccessful.19 It was recommended to young gentlemen 
that they spend a few years at university studying the liberal arts, and 
future lawyers socialized there or in pubs or university clubs. But for 
much of the eighteenth century, English legal education effectively 
lacked an institutional form. Aspiring gentlemen lawyers were left to 
educate themselves by reading ponderous abridgements, treatises, or 
other works of legal literature, and perhaps by apprenticing in the office 
of a lawyer, where they were likely to be busied with mechanical tasks. 
What was needed now was a substitute for the shared attitudes 
and values that had made it possible to reach consensus about the law 
using lawyerly methods. What was needed was a boundary constraint, 
though of course no one described it in those terms: a test, an authority, 
a rule or maybe a procedure, for settling with certainty what the law 
was. We begin to see lawyers commonly citing legal writings, and 
especially judicial opinions, in support of their descriptions of the law. 
 
 16. J.H. BAKER, THE LAW’S TWO BODIES: SOME EVIDENTIAL PROBLEMS IN ENGLISH LEGAL 
HISTORY 67–69 (2001) (describing common learning as including “a body of received wisdom about 
how questions can be framed and what kinds of answers are permissible or likely to find 
acceptance”). 
 17. A.W.B. SIMPSON, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL 
HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 359, 380 (1987). 
 18. Id. 
 19. DAVID LEMMINGS, PROFESSORS OF THE LAW: BARRISTERS AND ENGLISH LEGAL CULTURE 
IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 113–31 (2000). 
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Judicial opinions long possessed an authoritative status, but they had 
been subsumed into the fabric of common learning by the social practice 
of readings at the Inns and oral deliberations conducted by the bar; now 
they were to stand on their own.20 As a result, legal opinions themselves 
changed. They began to include more lengthy written expositions of the 
law, purporting to show how a decision followed from, or fit alongside, 
an existing corpus of authority.21 The “office of judgment” held by the 
judge very quickly came to seem inseparable from the exposition he 
offered in deciding a case or announcing a principle, and writers 
captured this sense by defining “judicial power” as a power to “expound” 
the law.22  
The increased importance of legal writings also carried in its 
wake a concern with establishing authoritative sources of the law. 
Which legal writings would count?23 Of course, if there were no 
agreement about which sources should be authoritative, sources would 
be unable to’ play the constraining role they were needed to play—the 
essence of Jeremy Bentham’s criticism, quoted by Professor Burset.24 
Relatedly, since the words of a legal writing mattered more, the 
authenticity of that writing emerged as an important measure of 
authority. It became important to know, for instance, whether quoted 
language had in fact used by the judge or by learned counsel. The 
construction of the legal archive became a matter of more than 
antiquarian and constitutional concern, but an integral feature of 
English law and legal practice.25 
Another feature of these developments is the increase, 
commonly observed, in the authority attributed to judicial precedent, 
and to the concomitant rise of a doctrine of stare decisis. Stare decisis 
required the judge to follow a governing decision even if convinced that 
it should not be followed in the present case for some other reason.26 
Such a doctrine increased the certainty of the law and drew the support 
of the common law’s most vocal critics, like Bentham. Of course, the 
degree of constraint provided would depend on what it meant for a 
previous decision to govern a present case; if “govern” were interpreted 
narrowly, even a doctrine of stare decisis would provide little constraint 
on judicial discretion. Advocates of a declaratory theory, like 
Blackstone, who wanted to render the law “certain” and protective of 
 
 20. See Burset, supra note *, at 663.  
 21. BAKER, supra note 16, at 78, 81, 85. 
 22. PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 219–20, 226, 239 (2008). 
 23. SIMPSON, supra note 17, at 380. 
 24. See Burset, supra note *, at 661–62.  
 25. Paul Halliday, Authority in the Archives, 1 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF L. 110, 112–14 (2014). 
 26. GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 187–88 (2d ed. 2019). 
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liberty, sought to stitch decisions together into a system, whose 
principles would then deductively constrain subsequent judicial 
decisions. In the terminology of the period, this was to treat the law as 
a “science.”27 The work of fabricating a uniform legal doctrine out of a 
series of cases became the task of judicial exposition as well as that of 
legal writers producing institutes and similar legal treatises.28 As 
Professor Burset describes, it was Mansfield more than any other 
English judge who was associated with the project of identifying such 
principles, although the differences between his views and Blackstone’s 
could be subtle.29  
The question posed regarding advisory opinions, it seems, was 
this: Were they the sort of legal writing that should have authoritative 
status as a source of law, consistent with the demand that the law be 
sufficiently certain to preserve English liberty? This is an intellectual 
question, but it grew out of social changes that had an effect on English 
law and legal institutions, namely, the decline of association and 
education of English lawyers. Throughout the period under study, the 
question could still be answered in different ways; several ways of 
thinking about advisory opinions were possible within the social and 
intellectual framework. The attitudes of leading English jurists toward 
advisory opinions, canvassed by Professor Burset in his article, nicely 
show this ambivalence—both the attraction and the sense of risk—and 
the continuing viability of advisory opinions despite the 
pronouncements of Sackville’s Case.30 If I am right about this, then we 
should concede that anxiety about the common law was likely not a 
sufficient cause of the transnational abandonment of advisory opinions. 
Rather, it was at most a necessary cause: it laid the foundation for 
political disputes to take on constitutional content by drawing on the 
widespread intellectual anxiety about the certainty of the law. It seems 
to me that there are two geographic sources of causation operating: one 
transnational, which follows the English common law to its colonies, 
and one local, attached to colonial institutions and to the politics that 
affected those institutions. 
 
 27. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW: AN ESSAY ON BLACKSTONE’S 
COMMENTARIES 12, 20–21 (1941); Kadens, supra note 14, at 1559, 1580; Barbara J. Shapiro, Law 
and Science in Seventeenth-Century England, 21 STAN. L. REV. 727, 728–29, 755 (1969). 
 28. MICHAEL LOBBAN, THE COMMON LAW AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE, 1760–1850 19, 27, 
34 (1991); A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise, in LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL 
HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE COMMON LAW 273, 280–82 (1987); BAKER, supra note 16, at 77–78. 
 29. Burset, supra note *, at 661.  
 30. See id., at 642–43, 664–66. 
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II. THE IMPERIAL SHADOW OF ENGLISH ANXIETY ABOUT THE LAW 
Let us briefly consider the case of American law. Professor 
Burset explores views of advisory opinions in the United States circa 
1790, but this is decades after their abandonment in England and some 
years after the events he describes in British Bengal. What of colonial 
British North America in the mid-eighteenth century? Did lawyers in 
Britain’s North American colonies experience the same intellectual 
anxieties about the common law? Does the available evidence suggest 
that their anxieties had a similar source in the socialization and 
training of American lawyers? 
There are some important distinctions to be made here. A 
number of historians have described a persistent or recurrent strain of 
utopian anti-lawyerism in American society and politics.31 In early 
Massachusetts, Virginia, and elsewhere, lawyers were banned from 
court, and their numbers remained strikingly small in every colony 
(sometimes in the single digits) through the end of the seventeenth 
century. By the second third of the eighteenth century, however, 
common lawyers in several colonies had gained a foothold, both for their 
profession and for their body of law. The continent’s first bar association 
opened in 1709 in New York City, which soon became a leading urban 
center for the practice of law.32 A handful of New York lawyers attended 
one of the Inns of Court, but most were trained as apprentices or 
“clerks” in a local law office.33 This was the dominant practice in all the 
colonies, excepting, to some degree, South Carolina and Virginia. In 
Virginia, a pretension to gentlemanly status among the planter class 
led to a significant number of bookish young men being dispatched to 
London to claim the Inn credential, but most did not practice as 
lawyers.34 The five Justices who signed the Correspondence renouncing 
advisory opinions provide a sample of the various paths open in the 
middle of the eighteenth century: John Jay, William Paterson, and 
James Wilson completed some university studies and then clerked in 
the office of an American attorney; John Blair, of Virginia, attended 
Middle Temple, one of the English Inns of Court; and James Iredell 
received no formal education at all, but read for the bar in a law office. 
 
 31. E.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 94–102 (2d ed. 1985). 
 32. 4 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: LAW AND THE 
CONSTITUTION ON THE EVE OF INDEPENDENCE, 1735–1776, at 11 (2018). 
 33. PAUL M. HAMLIN, LEGAL EDUCATION IN COLONIAL NEW YORK 18–21 (1939). 
 34. 3 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE CHESAPEAKE AND 
NEW ENGLAND, 1660–1750, at 47–50 (2016). 
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Jay and Blair hailed from aristocratic families, but the others did not.35 
By the time of their appointment to the Supreme Court, they all could 
claim some distinction in public life, but none was the product of a 
system of legal education anything like what had existed at the Inns 
and the courts of Westminster before the English Civil War. In America, 
as in England, there was simply no formal institution for socializing 
and training that might supply the habits of mind that had long afforced 
the common law. 
Nevertheless, as the example suggests, throughout the North 
American colonies the law attracted the same stirp of ambitious 
gentlemen who elected the profession in England. Many of these young 
men sought not just wealth, but influence and honor, and they 
congregated with one another to that end in a variety of informal 
associations, such as law and debating societies, like the “Moot” of the 
City of New York, where, in 1770, one could find John Jay, alongside 
other leading men, like William Livingston, Gouverneur Morris, and 
James Duane.36 Apprenticeship in the law office of an important local 
leader could serve the same acculturating function, as appears to have 
been the case under the reputable George Wythe in Virginia.37 Some 
young men also took a course of studies in the liberal arts, hoping to 
refine themselves, but there seems to have been less agreement in the 
colonies than in England about the utility of university study for a law 
career.38 Candidates for the bar were usually left to read and 
“commonplace” (compile excerpts) from law books in private collections 
or an academic library, and even among the ambitious, this might mean 
a wide range of things. John Adams made himself into a scholar; Patrick 
Henry, in contrast, famously claimed to have prepared for his 
examination by devoting a single month to reading Coke’s Institutes and 
a collection of Virginia’s laws.39 The need to self-educate was one reason 
why access to libraries was so important for American lawyers. 
 
 35. WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE CHIEF 
JUSTICESHIPS OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELLSWORTH 56–65 (1995). 
 36. HAMLIN, supra note 33, at 96–97, 201–03. 
      37.    See Alan McKinley Smith, Virginia Lawyers, 1680-1776: The Birth of a Profession, 43 
(1967) (Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University).  
 38. For example, a letter from Henry Tucker to his son, the future Virginia jurist, St. George 
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“an Academical Education” but of no use in practicing law. Id. at 39–40 (quoting Letter from Henry 
Tucker to St. George Tucker (Apr. 10, 1772)). Henry was concerned about the cost of his son’s 
university education. On the other hand, the Inns of Court were also expensive, and they provided 
no education at all. HAMLIN, supra note 33, at 21–22, 115–16. 
 39. On education by reading and commonplacing, see, e.g., JEFFERSON’S LEGAL 
COMMONPLACE BOOK, 1–3, 6 (David Thomas Konig & Michael P. Zuckert eds., 2019); Steilen, supra 
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Perhaps more than in England, the American evidence suggests 
the existence of an important social distance between the young, 
college-educated, aspiring lawyer-statesmen and the lawmakers who 
sat in provincial assemblies and on juries and even the judicial bench.40 
In Virginia these social divisions matured over the last quarter of the 
eighteenth century into partisan political controversies about the 
structure of the state’s legal system and the practice of law. The rhetoric 
of these controversies shared much in common with coeval English 
rhetoric about lawyers and liberty; thus, for example, an eminent 
Virginia planter and slave-owner, Landon Carter, dismissed what he 
called the “mechanical“ knowledge of professional lawyers, whose 
training had prepared them only for “knowing from whom to Copy 
Properly”—a reference to the forms and manuals that were popular in 
legal practice.41 (The justices of the peace, for their part, were often 
criticized for failing to observe established legal forms in their papers 
and proceedings.) But the opposite of “mechanical” knowledge—
lawyerly discretion—also caused anxiety, and in Virginia it triggered a 
defensive embrace of the local office of justice of the peace, usually filled 
by planters, rather than a centralized court system dominated by the 
educated legal elite practicing in Williamsburg. Supporters of the 
justices defended their wide jurisdiction and the insulation of their 
judgments from effective appellate review by invoking the language of 
radical English “country” politics, arguing that they protected liberty 
and staved off the corruption of centralized power.42 
These political disputes can be connected with theoretical claims 
about the law much like those we observed in England. In responding 
to their country critics, lawyers made use of the same ideas to 
emphasize the narrowness of judicial discretion and the certainty of the 
law. They embraced the familiar declaratory theory: that the task of the 
judge was merely to identify and declare legal principles, not to make 
or alter those principles.43 They sought to craft their opinions in a 
“deductivist” style—that is, to convey an impression that legal 
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principles deductively compelled a particular answer, and thus 
constrained judicial discretion. Perhaps the most successful 
practitioner of this method (ever) was a young Virginia lawyer named 
John Marshall.44 The attraction of deductivism to American lawyers 
may explain why, as historians have observed, Blackstone’s 
Commentaries was more popular in the United States than in England, 
where it invited significant criticism.45 In America, an edition of 
Blackstone edited by the Virginia jurist, St. George Tucker, was an 
immediate success and held its place as the preeminent learned 
American lawbook for nearly twenty years.46  
Tucker contributed, as well, to solving another of the problems 
faced by American jurists in this period, which was the dearth of 
properly “republican” legal authorities. The principles in Blackstone’s 
Commentaries were not consistent with republican government 
because they had not been adopted with consent.47 Tucker, Marshall, 
and other lawyers began to create case reports, raw materials for a 
republican common law, and by the early nineteenth century we can 
observe the emergence of a judicial practice of accumulating precedents 
in a lengthy written opinion, much like Blackstone had done on the 
English bench. Judge Tucker developed this art to such a degree that 
an alienated colleague on Virginia’s General Court, Spencer Roane, 
finally ripped one of Tucker’s opinions from his hands as he was reading 
it at conference and threw it on the floor, declaring that he refused to 
hear another of his “long, tedious, and ridiculous” opinions.”48 Other 
treatises written in the institute style joined Tucker’s Blackstone, 
including the Commentaries on American Law of the great New York 
judge, James Kent.49 This style of legal literature supported a view of 
the law as a system of principles, from which results in a case would 
determinately flow. 
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A full picture of these developments would require much more 
than the quick sketch I have given here. But we have enough, I think, 
to suggest the operative question for Professor Burset’s account of the 
British colony of Bengal: were its judges operating under social and 
political pressures like those in England and America? If so, did they 
induce writers to emphasize restrictions on judicial discretion? Was 
there a need, grounded in the same concerns, to identify authoritative 
sources of law? Or, on the other hand, were the actions and writings of 
officials in British Bengal guided by a different set of concerns, unique 
to that colony? 
III. THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION OF INTELLECTUAL ANXIETY AND 
ITS CONNECTION TO LOCAL POLITICS  
By the time of the Correspondence of the Justices, in 1793, 
advisory opinions had been in question in America for some time.50 If 
the absence of an institutional seat for lawyerly acculturation, 
association, and training led to an anxiety about judicial discretion and 
the authoritative status of advisory opinions, as I have suggested, then 
these causes seem to have been at work both in metropolitan England 
and its North American colonial periphery. Although it is complex, I do 
think we can call this a transnational explanation. But if we want to 
understand the relatively late timing of the formal abandonment of 
advisory opinions in America, it seems right to consider another factor 
as well: institutions. 
Let us start in an “old-fashioned” way, with a formal description. 
There was general agreement at the Constitutional Convention on the 
need for a national judicial power; on its vesting in a single, supreme, 
national court; on the court’s possession of a jurisdiction sufficient to 
vindicate national interests; and the need for the judges of that court to 
be independent by tenure and salary.51 The system of federal judges, 
federal courts, and federal jurisdiction constituted by Article III and the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 largely reflects this scope of agreement.52 
Although there was as of yet no general grant of what we know as 
“federal question jurisdiction,” the Act established a jurisdiction over 
civil enforcement actions and a system of federal district courts in which 
those actions might be brought, by federal attorneys, before federal 
judges. There was an appellate jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to 
 
 50. See Burset, supra note *, at 651.  
 51. This is a conventional view of the framing of the federal judicial power. See, e.g., RICHARD 
H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM ch. 
1 (7th ed. 2015). 
 52. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
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protect the Constitution and federal treaties from encroachment in 
state courts. An apparatus for the vigorous enforcement of federal law 
had been erected. In contrast, the Supreme Court of Judicature (SCJ) 
at Fort William, Bengal, had a different formal structure. Its judges 
were not independent in the same way; they held their seats at the 
pleasure of the Crown and, it seems, might be removed by legislative 
address—a power expressly rejected by the delegates at the 
Constitutional Convention.53 The SCJ’s jurisdiction was narrower than 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts, being largely confined to 
employees of the British East India Company and to those Bengalis who 
accepted it. What relevance do these formal, institutional differences 
have for interpreting the statements of judges who sat on the respective 
courts? They provide a framework for interpreting their statements, 
since it seems likely the formal structure of their courts influenced 
judges’ perception of institutional purposes and risks. 
We should also consider the resources available to these 
institutions, including people—that is, staff or personnel—since this 
can have a profound effect on the scope and development of institutional 
authority and the legal doctrines that describe it. Thus, it is sometimes 
observed that during the Confederation and Federalist periods of 
American history, there were few men qualified to give legal advice on 
delicate questions of state. As a result, perhaps, many elite lawyers and 
judges were recruited to serve in foreign-affairs roles.54 Once in this 
station, the men acquired further institutional expertise, increasing the 
state’s dependence on them. In this way, the small number of elite 
Americans trusted to conduct foreign affairs reinforced the traditional 
English practice of advisory opinions that Professor Burset describes.55   
It is also often observed that there was a general blurring of 
institutional boundaries between the great departments of the national 
government. This was related to personnel, but it was not just a matter 
of failing to separate persons; it also reflected the existence of 
conceptions, quite different from our own, of the proper powers of the 
departments of government.56 Most relevant here, early Americans 
 
 53. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 428–29 (Max Farrand ed., 
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seem to have conceived of their “independent” judicial power without 
the great emphasis we place today on the doctrine of justiciability. Here 
we should mention the practice by early Supreme Court justices of 
giving partisan jury charges, which passed beyond the case at hand and 
well into the realm of political speech; as well as the justices’ efforts to 
reinforce a tottering federal government by playing what the historian 
Ralph Lerner called “Republican Schoolmaster” to the multitudes 
gathered for a session of court.57 Though they persisted for some time, 
these activities were losing ground in the last decades of the eighteenth 
century. In our other jurisdictions, England and Bengal, we can also see 
inklings of a doctrine of ripeness, finality, and something like a 
principle of constitutional avoidance—notions that appear to have been 
imperfectly distinguished from the discomfort with advisory opinions.58 
Reviewing the evidence gives one the sense of witnessing the birth of a 
doctrine, whose precise contours were yet those of contemporary 
justiciability, but which was bound up quite closely with the 
institutional development of the judiciary. As the doctrine matured, the 
institutional range of judicial power simultaneously narrowed  
and firmed. 
The emerging desire to constrain the judicial office to the 
adjudication of litigated cases could have surprising effects, some of 
which may complicate Professor Burset’s account. Thus, according to a 
conventional understanding of the development of judicial review, 
conservative legal elites pushed for a judicial power to refuse to give 
effect to legislation as a means of curbing state assemblies under the 
influence of popular faction.59 Delegates at the Constitutional 
Convention were quite anxious to preserve this power against 
accusations of bias, such as might be invited if judges participated in 
the veto power by sitting on a “Council of Revision.”60 Judges injected 
into the political process of making law would be unable to exercise 
impartially their office of “expounding” the law when it came before 
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them in a case, which implied a power of judicial review.61 The irony, 
however, is that the power of judicial review ended up repeatedly 
injecting federal judges into matters of acute political controversy. If 
judges declined to give advisory opinions because they feared their 
partisan misuse, as Professor Burset argues, why would the same 
judges continue to strike down laws in the face of vitriolic partisan 
responses, such as were engendered in cases like McCulloch v. 
Maryland?62 Justice Marshall had to work over a number of years to 
fully establish an institutional power in the Court to review 
congressional statutes and presidential acts.63 He had no greater 
control over the use and reception of his judicial opinions than he did 
over extrajudicial statements; and the Court’s authority to issue 
judgments expanding national power and narrowing or invalidating 
state power was repeatedly challenged. Perhaps we should say that an 
institution itself can acquire developmental momentum, a self-
understanding and ethos, and that this momentum can carry its 
occupants on a trajectory they might otherwise not have elected, for fear 
of the political risk. 
It seems clear that the relationship of an intellectual anxiety 
about the authority of law, institutional form, politics, and legal 
doctrine could be extremely complex, and might involve overlapping, 
reinforcing, or conflicting imperial and local strands. If we turn to 
Professor Burset’s reconstruction of events in British-governed Bengal 
in the decades after the Regulating Act, I find it tempting to see 
multiple connections between local politics, institutional form, and an 
emerging doctrine of justiciability. The SCJ authorized by the 
Regulating Act and chartered by the Crown was intended to curb the 
power of the British East India Company (Company), which had grown 
so mighty that it mimicked an imperial power.64 To serve that end, 
British legislators thought it vital that the Court maintain its 
independence from company power. When Justice Impey, whose 
correspondence forms the basis of Professor Burset’s account, accepted 
a second judgeship with a company court, members of the House of 
Commons were angered, and resolved that he be made to “answer the 
charge of having accepted an office granted by, and tenable at, the 
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pleasure of the servants of the East India Company, which has a 
tendency to create a dependence in the said Supreme Court upon those 
over whose actions the said Court was intended as a controul.”65 The 
justices seem to have grasped this danger themselves, and asserted 
their powers, or held them in check, according to the effect on their 
court’s constitutional function. 
Thus, for example, from the beginning of questions triggered by 
Nandakumar’s confinement, Justice Impey expresses a concern that the 
court not take steps that undermine what Professor Burset calls “the 
appearance of impartiality.”66 Apparently it was important that the 
court’s control over the Company be exercised judicially, rather than 
politically. This required the observable maintenance of a formal 
separation between the court and council. In a subsequent letter, Impey 
asserted on behalf of the entire court that the council lacked “any legal 
authority . . . to review and control any judicial acts of the judges done 
either in or out of court.”67 The letter itself is an advisory opinion (of a 
sort) and expressly defends the judges’ right to act independent of 
council control “out of court.” The justiciability doctrine advanced here 
is therefore not the inappropriateness of advisory opinions, but the 
finality of judicial acts (in or out of court), as is conventionally 
represented in American jurisprudence by Hayburn’s Case.68 The final 
letter in the affair returns to this theme of independence by finality and 
the appearance of impartiality. The SCJ, wrote the judges, is “not in 
general justifiable” by the council. Its decisions are final. Since, 
however, the question now posed by the council could not come before 
the court judicially, its independence was not at risk and it could 
provide an opinion.69  
A resistance to giving advisory opinions clearly formed part of 
these events, but a willingness to give those opinions ultimately 
resolved the controversy over jurisdiction, and the firm ground to which 
the court retreated was its independence. The subsequent crisis over 
whether Warren Hastings or John Clavering was Governor-General 
exhibits a similar logic. When asked to decide who was lawfully 
governor, the court agreed to give its opinion only so long as it was 
treated as mere advice, rather than a judgment (an opinion whose 
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weight derived “from the reasoning of it, not from its authority”).70 The 
court’s apparent worry was losing its independence, since a judgment 
in favor of the Governor-General would imply some connection  
between them. 
It does seem right to conclude, as Professor Burset does, that an 
uncertainty about the authority of advisory opinions exposed judges to 
risk.71 A politician might solicit judicial advice and use it to shift blame 
for an unpopular decision to the judge. A judge might be accused of bias 
in a subsequent case that raised a legal question on which he already 
offered his opinion out of court. Should we explain the abandonment of 
advisory opinions as an effort by judges to avoid these risks, in light of 
an intellectual anxiety shared across the common-law world? Or should 
we conclude that these risks became part of a complex practical 
calculus, in which judges balanced worries about the misuse of advisory 
opinions with institutional and political concerns that sometimes 
pointed in a different direction? Sometimes judges simultaneously gave 
advice and declared that they were not under an obligation to do so; and 
sometimes they deliberately spoke out of court to defend what they 
perceived to be institutional rights or prerogatives; and sometimes they 
injected themselves into the midst of political controversy by using their 
decisions in litigated cases, despite the personal and institutional risks 
that doing so posed. These are some of the complexities that we must 
consider as we move forward with the project of understanding our 
federal judicial power from an imperial perspective. 
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